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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Electronic commerce may be defined as the ability to conduct business via electronic
network and to use the Internet as a commercial medium. 1 Since the 1990’s, electronic
commerce has grown rapidly, and the use of computer technology has enhanced the
possibilities offered. However, with the benefits of electronic commerce come downsides. For
instance, the wide range of information and choices available made more difficult for people
to search for information or to find relevant Web sites and data. New tools may remedy to this
kind of problem. Technology has been developed that enables individuals to use electronic
agents to make purchases or to conclude agreements.
Many definitions of electronic agents have been given. Although they have been
described as “a software thing that know [sic] how to do things that you could probably do
yourself if you had the time,” 2 a more technical definition would be to identify an electronic
agent as a “component of software and/or hardware which si capable of acting exactly in
order to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user.” 3 To lawyers, the term “agent” suggests the
application of the law of agents and principals, but this paper will defend the proposition that
the law of agents and principals should not necessarily govern the relationship between users
and their electronic agents.
Realizing the importance of electronic commerce for their economies, many nations
have attempted to regulate this new way of doing business and to find a just balance between
1

See Ling Bin, An Investigation of Distributed Agent-Based Systems in Electronic Commerce, available at
http://maotai.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/research/mres_dsm.htm (last visited June 8, 2004).
2
Bjorn Hermans, Intelligent Software Agents on the Internet: An Inventory of Current ly Offered Functionality in
the Information Society and a Prediction of (Near -)Future Developments (1996), available at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue2_3/ch_123/index.html (last visited June 8, 2004).
3
SYED MAHBUBUR RAHMAN & ROBERT J. BIGNALL, INTERNET C OMMERCE & SOFTWARE AGENTS : CASES,
TECHNOLOGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 76 (2001).

1

consumer protection and economic freedom. Today, the validity of contracts concluded by
electronic agents has been generally recognized. Nonetheless, many issues regarding their use
remain. This paper aims to explain an important subset of these issues and to describe
possible approaches. The paper will focus on the electronic formation of contracts and on
possible remedies available to the parties in the event of unwanted transactions.
International regulation of electronic contracts remains limited. This paper, therefore,
will focus on national law, and in particular on the law of the United States and of France, a
common law nation and a civil law nation. By comparing the approaches of these two
important modern legal systems, the paper aims to achieve a certain comprehensiveness in its
analysis of electronic agents.
First, because of the novelty of electronic agents, the paper will offer a description and
detailed definition. Part II of the paper then will focus on the validity and formation of the
contracts concluded by electronic agents. And Part III will explain some of the legal
consequences flowing from this new type of contract.

2

CHAPTER 2
DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC AGENTS

A.

Technical Features

There is no single definition of an electronic agent. Beyond the basic recognition that
an electronic agent is a “software thing,” 4 there are almost as many definitions available as
articles written on the topic. 5 It is nonetheless possible to find a common understanding and
agreed-upon characteristics that shape a technical definition of an electronic agent.

1.

Introduction to the World of Robots

A number of agent-based systems6 have been developed and this number will probably
increase in the next decades. 7 Not all of these systems are relevant here, but it is interesting to
note that different types of agents 8 already coexist in cyberspace and that the possibilities of
development are numerous.9 Thus, while researching electronic agents, one could come to
read about “robots” or “bots” 10 (also referred to as knowbots, softbots or taskbots11),

4

Bin, supra note 1.
See RAHMN ET AL., supra note 3, at 76; see also STUART J. RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, A RTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE : A MODERN A PPROACH 31 (1995).
6
See Bin, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
See Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56
BUS. LAW . 341, 343-44 (2000).
9
See Bin, supra note 1.
10
Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 343.
11
See Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Electronic Agents and the formation of Contracts, 4 (Published in the
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol.9 No.3, 204-34), available at
http://folk.uio.no/emilyw/documents/EMILY%20-%20Version%2019%20August%20&%20source.pdf (last
visit ed June 8, 2004).
5

3

autonomous agents 12 or other intelligent agents. 13 Autonomous agents can accomplish many
different tasks. Some of them will search the web and gather information needed by their
users (data mining bots14); others will be able to index millions of web pages (web
crawlers15). An exhaustive list of the robots currently in use would be too long and is not the
purpose of this paper. 16
If all robots are software, does it follow that every software application can be seen as
an electronic agent? Experts 17 have tried to find attributes which, when present in software,
make it “[behave] like an autonomous agent.”18 One of the most comprehensive theories
developed 19 distinguishes between “strong” and “weak” agency. To be characterized as an
agent at all, software must possess several fundamental attributes that correspond to the
“weak notion.” 20 Robots may also possess additional auxiliary features (the “strong notion” 21)
but need not possess these features to qualify as electronic “agents.”

12

See Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at note 3 (quoting Stan Franklin & Art Graesser, Is it An Agent or
Just a Program? A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents (1996)).
13
See Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at note 4.
14
Id., at 343.
15
Id.
16
BotSpot maintains such a list, available at http://www.botspot.com/search (last visited on June 8, 2004).
17
Professors Stan Franklin and Art Graesser are two such experts. See Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at note
13.
18
Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 345.
19
See Wooldridge and Jennings, Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice, Knowledge Engineering Review Vol.
10 No.2, June 1995 (Cambridge University Press: 1995).
20
See id.; see also Bin, supra note 1.
21
See Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19; see also Bin, supra note 1.
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The following table shows the four fundamental attributes.22

Property

Description

Reactivity

The agent perceives and reacts to changes in
the environment

Autonomy

The agent exercises control over its actions
and operate without direct intervention of
humans or others.

Persistence

The agent is a continually running process,
which is not changed capriciously.

Ability to communicate

The agent communicates with people, other
bots and its environment.

Autonomy is the key characteristic in distinguishing electronic agents from software in
general. 23 The “strong notion” of electronic agents comprises additional properties usually
associated with humans. Some “strong notion” writers 24 emphasize “mentalist” 25 concepts,
such as beliefs or intentions; others 26 refer to human-like attributes, such as emotions.
The following table shows some of the auxiliary attributes27 of autonomous agents.
The list is not exhaustive. Other properties could be used to refer to an autonomous agent.

22

Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at 345; see also Wooldridge et al., supra note 19.
See RUSSELL & NORVIG , ARTIFICIAL I NTELLIGENCE: A M ODERN APPROACH 35 (Prentice Hall : New Jersey
1995).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Bates, 1994, Ba tes et al, 1992 quoted by Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19.
27
Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19; see also Bin, supra note 1.
23
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Property

Description

Mobility

The agent can transport itself from one
machine to another while preserving its
internal state.

Reasoning

The agent can change its behavior based on
current knowledge or past experiences.

Benevolence

The agent does not have conflicting goals

Veracity

The agent will not knowingly communicate
false information

Ability to plan

The agent is able to choose between different
courses of action in order to achieve its
goals.

Learning

The agent may accumulate knowledge based
on past experience and subsequently modify
its behavior.

2.

Autonomous Agents Used for Contracting

In the simplest versions of electronic contracting, there is no need for autonomous
electronic agents:28 Software programs simply issue standard offers and record acceptances
from buyers. Electronic agents, however, can be “active participant[s] in the trading
process.” 29 Machines that are autonomous and that learn through experience30 can manifest
behavior associated with free will. 31
There is every reason to expect that electronic agents will become more and more
sophisticated, reaching imaginable, but remarkable levels of autonomy later in the century,
but electronic agents already are used in the process of contracting. To understand exactly at
28

Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25, 26. (1996)
Id., at 26.
30
See supra tables pp.4-5.
31
Allen & Widdison., supra note 28, at 27.
29
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which stage an autonomous agent can be used, the Consumer Buying Behavior Model was
created. 32 There are six basic stages in a consumer’s buying process. These stages are need
identification, product brokering, merchant brokering, negotiation, purchase/delivery, and
product service and evaluation. First, the individual or buyer recognizes a need for something.
Second, several products are presented, tailored to the buyer’s desires. Third, different sellers
are identified. Fourth, after product and merchant are identified, the terms of the contract are
negotiated. Fifth, the product is purchased and delivered, and the company may offer postsale service. Finally, the buyer evaluates the experience. According to experts, 33 today’s
autonomous agents could be used at the first four stages of the model. These stages
correspond to the steps leading to the conclusion of the contract and could be handled by one
or several agents. Moreover, it is not impossible to imagine that in the future electronic agents
will be able to take care of every step of the process without the intervention of a human
being. Agreements then will be concluded by the electronic agents and not only through
them. 34
Kasbah 35 is one of the many agent-based systems available on the Internet.36 Users of
Kasbah can create agents to help buy or sell a particular product. The seller registers his
product with the Kasbah server via a computer interface, 37 and buyers go to the server to look
for items. Users can develop buying or selling strategies before sending their agents into the
market place. The Kasbah agents intervene at the fourth stage of the Consumer Buying
Behavior Model38-- negotiation. Sellers’ agents “know” the seller’s bottom price and the price

32

See Maes et al., Agents that Buy and Sell: Transforming Commerce as We Know It, Communications of the
ACM, March 1999, Vol. 42, No.3, pp. 81-91.
33
Id.
34
See Ian R. Kerr, Providing for Autonomous Electronic Devices in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act 18,
available at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/ekerr.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004).
35
See Moukas et al., Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: An MIT Media Laboratory Perspective 3, available
at http://web.media.mit.edu/~moux/papers/icec98.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004).
36
See for instance Vendio.com (former AuctionWatch.com), Teksell.com, Ebay.com or Ebreviate.com (last
visited June 8, 2004).
37
See Bin, supra note 1, at 10.
38
See Maes et al., supra note 32.
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the seller would like to have, and they can be equipped with some bargaining tactics,
including how and when to lower the price during the negotiation. Buyers’ agents offer bids
to sellers’ agents that can answer in the affirmative or negative until a deal is reached.
The Kasbah agents, as described, focus only on the element of price. It is not
impossible, however, to imagine electronic agents following more complex instructions. Let’s
assume, for instance, that two individuals, John and Brad, do not know each other. John wants
to buy a new car, but he is too busy and does not have time to surf the Internet to find the best
car at the best price. He therefore releases his electronic agent into cyberspace with
instructions to purchase the car of his dreams. To be sure that the electronic agent knows what
to do, John gives the agent a specified range of prices (the bottom price and the ideal price)
and other terms such as the brand (a BMW), the color (red is better but John would be okay
with a black or blue car; on the other hand, he specifies that he refuses to buy a yellow or
green car), the year, etc. He also might instruct his agent that if the model is more recent he is
ready to pay more. On the other side, the seller, Brad, is the owner of a used BMW. He was
promoted recently and wishes to buy a new Mercedes. Brad does not want to waste his time
posting an advertisement and selecting the best buyer. He decides, therefore, to use a software
agent that he instructs to sell his car within a specified range of prices and other terms
(delivery, warranty, etc.) to the highest bidder. Brad and John will never discuss the terms of
the contract together. Their agents, after interacting with other agents to find the best deal,
will arrange the sale of the used BMW. In this rather simple hypothetical, the agent has more
instructions to deal with and may be able to initiate and conclude the transaction by itself.
As has been noted by others,39
[a]gents will no doubt be employed to assist human interaction
through the various stages of a transaction from product and
merchant brokering through to negotiation, sale, distribution and
payment. It is not unreasonable to predict that, in time, agent
39

Kerr, supra note 34, at 19.
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technology will become sufficiently sophisticated to perform many
if not all of these sorts of tasks without human oversight or
intervention. 40

A company, for instance, can use an electronic agent to manage its office supplies. In
such a case, the electronic agent monitors the stock and when the stock fell to a certain level,
the agent selects the best offer from several suppliers. It orders the amount the company
needs. The electronic agent, without the company or its human employees even knowing
about it, would perform the whole transaction. 41

B.

Statutory Definition of Electronic Agents

As we have seen, experts have tried to arrive at a definition of electronic agents based
on the technical characteristics and skills of agents. They have had some difficulties in finding
a generally accepted definition. This may be because autonomous agents are still in their early
development and it is hard to foresee what exactly they will be able to do. It is axiomatic that
law lags technology. It should come as no surprise, then, that our legal systems have only
begun to address the issues peculiar to electronic agents, and the law’s response to the rapidly
increasing autonomy of these agents remains especially undeveloped.

40

Id.
See Jean-François Lerouge, The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law: Suggested
Solutions on a European and American level, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & I NFO. L. 406. (1998)
41
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1.

American Legislation

a.

The UETA & E-SIGN: Confusing Differences

i.

The UETA

A natural starting point in describing American law is the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA). 42 The UETA is not a federal statute enforceable by the courts. It
was drafted and adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in the hope that it would be enacted by state legislatures.43 Nothing obliged the states to
enact it, but as of the beginning of 2004, it has been enacted by 46 States.44
Drafted in the summer of 1999, the eleven-page Act deals with digital signatures,
electronic contracts, automated transactions, and transactions between parties when both
parties have agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. This paper focuses on the
UETA provisions governing automated transactions. 45 The Act creates a set of rules that
apply to electronic agents. The first important provision is the definition of an electronic
agent.46 The Act de fines an electronic agent as “a computer program or an electronic or other
automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.” 47 The UETA’s

42

UNIFORM ELECTRONIC T RANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (1999), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004).
43
NCCUSL is a non-profit organization created in 1892. Its purpose is to enhance the uniformity of law by
drafting model state laws and encourage states to pass them. See National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform States Laws website, available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp (last visited May 24,
2004).
44
As of May 24, 2004, UETA had been adopted in several cases with non-uniform provisions in 46 states and
introduces in 2004 in the states of Alaska and South Carolina. For more information, see
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts -fs-UETAasp (last visited May 24, 2004).
45
UETA §2. An “automated transaction” is defined as “a transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in
part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not
reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or
fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.”
46
UETA §2(6).
47
Id.
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drafters,48 despite the use of the term “electronic agent,” viewed current “agents” as tools of
their users. The drafters appreciated, however, the experts’49 conviction that the technology
likely will evolve so that at some point electronic agents will “act autonomously, and not just
automatically.” 50
The new Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 51 as revised in May
2003 52 includes provisions regarding contracts for the sale of goods concluded by one or two
electronic agents. The definition of an electronic agent 53 under the new Article 2 was
borrowed from the UETA, 54 and the exact language of the UETA was used for the UCC.
Therefore, whether under the UETA or the UCC, the term “electronic agent” refers to the
same thing.

ii.

The E-SIGN

E-Sign, or the Electronic Commerce in Global and National Commerce Act,55 was
signed on June 30, 2000 by President Clinton. Its purpose is to facilitate the use of electronic
media in transactions and to implement a uniform legal basis regarding electronic
commerce.56 E-Sign contains only two provisions on electronic agents, 57 including a
definition of electronic agent. E-Sign was based in part on the UETA, 58 and the definition of
electronic agent set out in E-Sign59 is similar to UETA’s definition. 60 There is, nonetheless, a

48

UETA §2 cmt. 5.
See Allen et al., supra note 28; see also Bin, supra note 1.
50
UETA, §2 cmt. 5.
51
UCC §§ 2 -101, 2-102 (1968).
52
UCC §2-204 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), available at
http://www.ali.org/ (last visited June 9, 2004).
53
Id, at. §2-103(1)(g). An electronic agent is defined as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated
means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in
part, without review or action by an individual.”
54
UCC §2-204 cmt. 4.
55
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT (2000).
56
Jane K. Winn & Robert A. Witte, E-Sign of the Times , 2 No. 9 E-Commerce L. Rep. 2 (2000).
57
E-SIGN, § 101(a)(2). See also infra Chapter 3 for the recognition of the validity of contracts concluded by
electronic agents.
58
Winn et al., supra note 56.
59
E-SIGN, §106(3).
49
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difference important enough to create some confusion. E-Sign states that an electronic agent
acts “without review or action by an individual at the time of the action or response.”61 By
adding a specific time where the UETA does not specify anything, the E-Sign leads one to
wonder if under the UETA, a system that needs human intervention after some stages of the
process can be characterized as an electronic agent. 62 Nevertheless, since the E-Sign provides
that state enactment of the UETA may supercede E-Sign with respect to state law if the
UETA is adopted as recommended by NCCUSL, 63 perhaps no issues will arise from these
differences. 64

b.

The UCITA

The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act65 was adopted on July 24, 1999
by the NCCUSL.66 The Act’s purpose is to regulate e-commerce, and it contains several
provisions regarding the use of electronic agents. 67 When starting to work on this new set of
rules for e-commerce, the NCCUSL drafters actually intended to revise Article 2 of the
UCC 68 in order to take into account the use of new technologies.69 A Committee 70 was
charged to draft a new Article 2B for the UCC.71 After a certain period, the drafters realized
that electronic transactions were different from traditional ones and could not be integrated

60

UETA §2(6).
E-SIGN, §106(3).
62
Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at 351.
63
E-Sign, §102(a)(1).
64
Middlebrook et al., supra note8, at 351.
65
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004).
66
See supra note 45.
67
UCITA §§ 107, 112, 202, 206 & 214.
68
UCC art.2 governs the contracts for sale of goods.
69
Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004).
70
The Drafting Committee on Electronic Communications in Contractual Transactions, later renamed the
Drafting Committee on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, was created by the NCCUSL in 1996.
71
See supra note 69.
61
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into the articles of the UCC.72 Thus, the project was renamed UCITA. The Act is more
ambitious than the UETA73 and more controversial.74 In 2002, only Maryland and Virginia
had adopted the UCITA. 75
The UCITA addresses electronic agents. 76 According to the UCITA drafters, 77 an
electronic agent is “a computer program or electronic or other automated means used
independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic messages or performances without
review or action by an individual at the time of the action, response or performance.” 78 This
definitional language incorporates the notion of autonomy. On the other hand, the Act’s
comments 79 provide that “the automated system must have been selected, programmed or
otherwise used for that purpose by the person that is bound by its operations.” 80 In a
subsequent section, this paper will examine more fully the implications of the UCITA’s
approach for the legal relationship between the electronic agent and its user. 81 It is important
to note here, however, that the UCITA seems to treat the agent as a hybrid creature, with
elements of a traditional agent and a communication tool. 82

2.

No Definition under European Statutes

When it comes to the definition of electronic agents, there is no statute available today in
the European Union that clarifies the issue. Regulatory initiatives in fact are very limited. If

72

David D. Wong, The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents: E-Commerce and Beyond…, 33 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
83, 92 (1999).
73
See Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 352.
74
Id.
75
See UCITA in the States, available at http://www.cpsr.org/program/U.C.I.T.A/U.C.I.T.Astates.html (last
visited June 9,2004).
76
See infra pp.25 -26.
77
See supra note 67.
78
UCITA §102(28).
79
UCITA §102(28), Reporter’s Note.
80
Id.
81
See infra Chapter 2.C.1.
82
Lerouge, supra note 41, at 421.
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some European Acts recognize in general the validity of contracts concluded by electronic
means, there is no direct reference to the possibility of conclusion through or by electronic
agents.

83

83

See infra Chapter 3.B.1.
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CHAPTER 3
VALIDITY AND FORMATION OF CONTRACTS CONCLUDED BY ELECTRONIC
AGENTS

A.

Distinguishing Older Forms of Electro nic Contracting (Electronic Data Interchange)
from the New Electronic Agents

Electronic means actually have been used in business transactions for the past twenty
years,84 mainly with the use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 85 EDI is a method that
businesses use to exchange information electronically, 86 from orders and confirmations
constituting a contract to inventory management and shipment status. 87 EDI was developed in
the early 1970s. 88 A significant characteristic of EDI is that “the information being
communicated is structured into standard formats, permitting effective, comprehensible data
exchanges irrespective of the particular hardware or software implemented at either end of the
transmission by the communicating parties.” 89 In the 1990s, some said EDI introduced
“fundamental changes in the manner in which contracts for the sale of goods are made and
performed.” 90 In addition, the Electronic Messaging Services Task Force noted that the
existing rules regarding the formation and the validity of contracts were inappropriate for the
use of EDI. 91 The traditional rules of interpretation were also said inadequate for contracts

84

Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 Emory L.J. 1047, 1050 (2001).
The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange – A
Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. Law. 1645, 1649 (1990).
86
Bellia, supra note 84, at 1050.
87
Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 347.
88
The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 85, at 1650.
89
Id.
90
Id., at 1649.
91
Id., at 1649-1650
85
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concluded through EDI. 92 Therefore, a model agreement was developed. 93 The parties using
EDI usually establish a written agreement at the beginning of the relationship regarding the
kinds of transactions they agree to conduct via this method. 94 Because of the costs EDI
generates, its users are primarily big corporations.95 In addition, no litigation has arisen from
the use of EDI96 and, therefore, no body of case law has been developed to create a legal
framework for resolving EDI disputes. This lack of litigation makes using EDI as a model for
setting rules regarding the use of electronic agents difficult.97 Moreover, electronic agents
differ considerably from EDI in different aspects.98 First, the parties to a contract concluded
through autonomous agents usually do not know each other. EDI parties do know each
other.99 Second, EDI parties have signed a trading partner agreement before any
transaction. 100 Finally, with EDI, the parties are usually corporations that use EDI for repeated
transactions with the same buyer or seller. With electronic agents, one or both of the parties
may be a consumer. 101 Thus, electronic agency is a broader concept that has potentially more
wide reaching impact than EDI has in the past.

92

Id.
The Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement, as proposed by The Electronic Messaging
Services Task Force, supra note 85, at 1650.
94
Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 347.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id,. at 348.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
93

16

B.

Statutory Recognition

1.

The European Union

In 1997, the European Commission promulgated an Initiative on Electronic Commerce
with the goal to create a coherent framework for electronic commerce and to promote its
growth in Europe.102 Several Directives resulted from this Initiative. The three most important
are the Directive on Electronic Commerce, 103 the Directive on Electronic Signatures 104 and
the Directive on Distance Contracts. 105 The Directive on Electronic Signatures does not
present particular relevance for the purpose of this analysis. A few words must be said
regarding the Directive on Distance Contracts. 106

The Act was passed on May 20, 1997 and

“aims to approximate informational requirements of the Member States’ laws concerning
distance contracts between consumers and suppliers in order to protect the consumers.” 107 A
distance contract is defined as
any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a
supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or
service-provision scheme run by the supplier, who, for the purpose
of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of
distance communication up to and including the moment at which
the contract is concluded. 108
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The Directive therefore applies to contracts concluded on the Internet, implicitly recognizing
this type of contract.109 Nonetheless, it does not say anything regarding the use of electronic
means in particular. In addition, it contains a lot of exceptions concerning the types of
contracts subject to the law. 110
The newest and most important European regulation regarding electronic contracting
is the Directive on Electronic Commerce. 111 It was issued on June 8, 2000. Its objective is “to
create a legal framework to ensure the free movement of information society services between
Member States….” 112 For the Parliament and Council, the elimination of obstacles in
cyberspace falls into the same category as the suppression of internal frontiers within the
Community. 113 Therefore, the Directive on Electronic Commerce requires the European
States to remove every legal obstacle to the use of electronic contracts. 114 Article 9 of the
Directive regarding the treatment of contract states that
[m]ember States shall ensure that their legal system allows
contracts to be concluded by electronic means. Member States
shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements applicable to
the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of
electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of
legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having been
made by electronic means.115

By this provision, the Act officially recognizes the validity of contracts concluded through
electronic means and seeks to ensure that these contracts will be enforceable in every
European country. Although the Directive does not expressly mention electronic agents, and
there is no definition of what the drafters intended by “electronic means,” it may reasonably
be inferred that electronic agents are part of “electronic means.” This inference is reinforced
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by the Executive Summary of the Proposal text of the Directive, 116 which provides that the
“Member States will … not prevent the use of electronic systems as intelligent electronic
agents.”117
Paragraph (2) of Article 9 provides a list of exceptions. 118 The States may decide, for
instance, that Paragraph (1) will not apply to real estate transactions or to contracts governed
by family law or by the law of succession. 119 Nonetheless, the Directive makes sure not to
give the States the opportunity to use this list of special contracts to prevent the enforceability
of electronic contracts in an extensive and abusive way. Thus, the States are required to
submit a list of these contracts and, every five years, a report on the application of the
exceptions. 120
It is important to note here that these Directives are not self-executing. 121 They must be
transposed into the national legal systems of the different States. 122 The States usually have
two years to adopt new laws or modify their existing regulations to comply with the European
Directive. 123 When a contract is concluded, therefore, it is national law (and not the Directive)
that governs the transaction, 124 but the Directive ensures that national regulations are uniform,
at least to some extent. Thus, it was decided that the States had to transpose the Directive on
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Electronic Commerce by January 17, 2002.125 Luxemburg, Austria and Germany were the
only countries to meet the deadline.126 Today, France still has not transposed the Directive. 127
France, however, and other States 128 have introduced into its legislation a horizontal provision
stipulating that contracts concluded by electronic means have the same legal validity as
contracts concluded by more traditional means. 129 In addition, the Directive still may be
applied in the other European States. When the deadline has passed and a Directive is still not
transported into national law, individuals may invoke the European Act directly before the
national courts, if its provisions are clear, precise and unconditional. 130
Therefore, the European Community has recognized the va lidity of contracts
concluded through electronic means, and consequently through autonomous agents, although
no express provision has been passed on the matter yet. Nevertheless, as will be developed
later, 131 national legislatures still play a central role regulating contracts concluded through
electronic agents.

2.

The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce

In 1996, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
adopted a Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 132 The Model Law aims to remove legal
obstacles regarding the use of electronic commerce and to set a framework for it. 133 The text
is neither an international convention nor a treaty and therefore it does not have any binding
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effect. 134 Nevertheless, Illinois in the United States, and Ireland and France in Europe, have
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 135 Furthermore, both the
United States, with the UETA, 136 and the European Union, with the Directive on Electronic
Commerce, 137 used the Model Law on Electronic Commerce in their legislation regarding the
matter. As stated in Article 5, 138 the main purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law is to make
sure that information will “not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the
grounds that it is in the form of a data message.”139
Although the Model Law does not expressly use the term “electronic agent,” the
notion is implied in Article 2, 140 which defines the originator of a data message as the
“person by whom, or on whose behalf, the data message purports to have been sent or
generated prior to storage, if any, but it does not include a person acting as an intermediary
with respect to that data message.” 141 In addition, in the comments on Article 2, 142 the
drafters explain that the notion of “person” must be understood as referring both to natural
persons and legal entities. 143 “Data messages that are generated automatically by computers
without direct human intervention” 144 therefore fall into the scope of Article 2(c). The Model
Law states, moreover, that a data message is deemed to be that of the originator if it was sent
“by an information system programmed by, or on behalf of, the originator to operate
automatically.” 145 The drafters of the Model Law decided not to address fully and directly,
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however, the substantial questions of principal-and-agent law that can arise with the use of
electronic agents :

[T]he Model Law should not be misinterpreted as allowing for a
computer to be made the subject of rights and obligations. Data
messages that are generated automatically by computers without
direct human intervention should be regarded as "originating" from
the legal entity on behalf of which the computer is operated.
Questions relevant to agency that might arise in that context are to
be settled under rules outside the Model Law. 146
Thus, if the Model Law implicitly recognizes the validity of contracts concluded through the
use of electronic agents, it also makes clear that an electronic agent cannot be seen as the
legal entity behind the offer and acceptance of a contract. Rather, an electronic agent should
be considered as acting on behalf of a responsible legal entity: An autonomous agent may be
seen either as a mere communication tool or as the agent of its user. 147

3.

The United States

As has been stated earlier, 148 there are three main attempts of legislation regarding
electronic agents available in the United States: UETA 149, E-Sign 150 and UCITA.151

a.

UETA & Article 2 of the UCC

We have seen earlier 152 that the new Article 2 of the UCC as revised in May 2003
borrows the definition of electronic agent from the UETA153 On the other hand, the UETA
146
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refers to Article 2 and common law principles in order to determine whether there is
formation of a contract.154 Indeed, the UETA does not aim to provide substantive law
regarding electronic contracts.155 Nonetheless, both texts recognize the validity of a contract
formed by electronic agents. Thus, the UETA establishes that a contract may be formed
either by two electronic agents or by one electronic agent and an individual. 156 Section 14157
provides rules regarding automated transactions and states that:
(1) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic
agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or
reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms
and agreements.
(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an
electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s
own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction in
which the individual performs actions that the individual is free
to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has
reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the
transaction or performance. 158

In addition, the UETA, unlike Article 2, requires the party’s assent to conduct an electronic
transaction. 159 Also, the UETA gives the party a non-waivable right to refuse future
electronic transactions,160 while Article 2 specifically validates any action of the electronic
agent and attributes it to the parties. 161 On the other hand, the provision of the UETA related
to the attribution of electronic records does not expressly mention electronic agents. 162 UETA
provisions seem to rely on Article 2 of the UCC,163 but with the revision of the latter,
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difficulties may arise. 164 Nevertheless, both the UETA and the new Article 2 envisage use of
electronic agents in situations where humans program their machines to act according to
certain parameters. 165 It is also interesting to note that Article 2 opens the door to new
possibilities (or problems 166) since it does not require human intervention or assent before the
conclusion of the contract. The UETA does not prevent a party from raising the absence of
assent. 167 However, absence of assent may be no longer available as a defense under the new
Article 2.

b.

E-Sign

We said earlier in this analysis that E-Sign 168 contains only two provisions on
electronic agents: a definition169 and a principle similar to the UETA that a contract may not
be denied effect solely because it was formed by electronic agents. 170 The use of electronic
agents is therefore authorized by E-Sign. Nonetheless, E-Sign recognizes the validity of
contracts concluded by autonomous agents only as “long as the action of any such electronic
agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.” 171 These last words may encourage
parties to avoid responsibility by denying that the actions of the electronic agent are legally
attributable to them.172 Once again, these issues may never arise since E-Sign contains an
express savings clause regarding state enactment of the UETA 173
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c.

UCITA

The UCITA, like the other Acts, states the general principle that contracts
concluded through the use of electronic agents are enforceable, and “even if no individual
was aware of or reviewed the agent’s operations or the results of the operations.”174 It also
attributes an electronic agent’s actions to its owner. 175 But the UCITA goes further than the
other texts by trying to set rules as to the manifestation of assent by an electronic agent. 176
Section 112 177 provides that an “electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after
having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent authenticates the record or term; or
engages in operations that in the circumstances indicate acceptance of the record or term.” 178
The use of circumstances to decide whether there is acceptance may result in defenses that
will have to be examined by the trier of facts and that will therefore survive a motion for
summary judgment. 179 Nevertheless, the UCITA drafters have tried to foresee the possible
problems by adding in the Comments180 that assent of an electronic agent must be measured
by its ability to react and by an assessment of the implications of its actions, since assent
cannot be based on knowledge or reason to know. 181 Moreover, the conduct or operations
manifesting assent may be proved in any manner. 182 The UCITA also provides an
opportunity to review the contract and explains how this opportunity must be understood
when exercised by an electronic agent. 183 Thus, an electronic agent “has an opportunity to
review a record or a term only if it is made available in a manner that would enable a
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reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or term.”184 The reference to
“reasonably configured” implies the existence of standards regarding the configuration of
trading bots and as long as these standards are not created or at least not generally
recognized, complex litigation may arise. 185
If contracts concluded by electronic agents are now widely recognized by
legislatures, none of the attempt of regulation described abo ve deals expressly with the
question regarding the status to give electronic agents. Therefore, we must look to general
principles and see if any is applicable to electronic agents.

C.

Doctrinal Problems

1.

Capacity of Contracting

As the preceding discussion suggests, an electronic agent might be seen merely as
a communication tool, something like a telephone or a fax machine. The emergence of
autonomous electronic agents, however, invites the application of at least some of legal
doctrines governing principals and agents. And there is the intriguing notion that autonomous
electronic agents ought to be treated in some ways as legal “persons.”

a.

Legal Personhood

American law and French law take somewhat different approaches to the question of
who or what should be treated as a legal “person” with the capacity to contract. The two legal
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systems therefore might be expected to differ on the question of whether computer programs
should be treated as legal “persons.”

i.

The United States

A person may be defined as “a subject of legal rights and duties.” 186 It is well
recognized that legal persons can be natural or artificial. 187 The range of artificial persons is
broad, ranging from corporation to ships or even international organizations. 188 American
law does not expressly bar the treatment of computers as legal persons.189 Actually, there is
no rule to determine whether a certain entity is entitled to legal personhood. 190 Authors
envision three possible arguments under which legal personality could be conferred to
computers.191 The first explanation is moral entitlement. 192 When a person has rights or
interests that are specific and individual, the person needs to be given legal personality to
protect the rights or interests. 193 Thus, for instance, some authors have said that whales
should be conferred legal personality because they have achieved some level of selfconsciousness and are capable of suffering. 194 This argument has been extended to
imaginable computers.195 For the advocates of this theory, 196 the fact that self-consciousness
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does not result from biological processes should not matter.197 The key point is selfconsciousness. If a machine possesses self-consciousness, then it can claim a dignity
analogous to human dignity and ought to have the protection flowing from legal personhood.
No one has demonstrated, of course, that any existing computer program possesses selfconsciousness. 198 And even assuming that self-conscious software will emerge, selfconsciousness may not be an adequate criterion for legal personhood.199 Perhaps most
importantly here, the focus of this paper is not harm to autonomous electronic agents, but
protection of those who use these agents to create some rights or duties and the validity of the
agreements resulting from this use. 200 The protection of the software, which does not have
any separate interest in the transaction, is not really relevant here.201
Another possible reason for conferring legal personality on software agents is the
recognition of social reality. 202 Under this theory, an entity is recognized as a le gal person
because it is already seen as a person by society. 203 Individuals, for example, are the creators
of organizations, but organizations easily can be described as having their own objectives and
as acting according to their own policies. 204 On the othe r hand, in the legal context, a legal
person is simply an entity whose acts have legal consequences. 205 Thus, under social reality
theory, deeming entities legal persons is necessary in order to adapt the law to an existing
situation. 206 For instance, it would be very difficult to treat lobbying organizations only as
groups of individuals. Society recognizes these organizations as distinct from the individuals
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that create them. Therefore, attributing legal personality to these organizations is the best
way to adapt law to reality and to ensure that law is applied properly. 207 “The legal system is
exposed

to

massive

pressure

to

complete

the

social

personification

by

legal

personification.” 208
Computers are obviously very different from organizations, but the practic al
arguments for conferring legal personhood on computers are similar. We want to distinguish
the entity’s actions from the actions of its members. 209 In a similar way, when it comes to
computers, we might have practical reasons to distinguish between the ma chine and its
user. 210 Thus, the relevant question is whether those who trade with electronic agents see the
agent, rather than its owner, as the source of the communication. 211 The question is really one
of perception. Society is now inclined to accept that computers can manage difficult
operations by themselves, even play chess. 212 Is society ready to say that computers are
distinct persons because they can conclude contracts? Perhaps not. The reasonable person
probably would look for hints of characteristically human behavior:213 Does an electronic
agent, during the process of formation of the contract, act like a human being would? Is there
some bargaining strategy? Is this strategy one that a natural person would employ? This
requirement does not seem to be a hindrance. After all, electronic agents are developed to
negotiate and conclude contracts. The construction of a trading strategy is one of their
features, or at least will be in the near feature. If so, it is not impossible that society will
recognize computers as initiating and conducting negotiations independently from their
human controllers. This would certainly “put pressure on the legal system to describe the
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computer as a legal person.” 214 Some authors 215 go further by envisaging a “social hybrid
person” 216 constituted by the human and the machine. They argue that the concept of
partnership might be more accepted than the idea of a computer acting on its own. 217 And
this concept still would enable the human to distinguish himself from his electronic agent’s
actions. 218 Nonetheless, if this argument presents incontestable advantages, it is difficult to
see how a tandem man-machine may be widely accepted and recognized as an entity by
itself.
The last reason for deeming computers legal persons is mere convenience. 219 The
main purpose under this view is to protect the persons who reasonably rely on the actions of
the machine.220 With this purpose in mind, we then decide which solution is the most
convenient and least expensive to apply. Ships are an example of legal exp ediency. Society
does certainly not see ships as persons, nor as having a moral entitlement to legal personality.
Nonetheless, by treating ships as legal persons, we ensure that the rights of the persons who
“do business with them” are protected. And this is the reason why electronic agents raise a
different issue. Giving autonomous agents legal personality would not help to protect people
who deal with them. If the electronic agent is not a legal person and is seen only as a
software application, 221 the parties to a contract concluded through electronic agents will be
the human controllers. Therefore, the party who feels his or her rights have been neglected
will turn to the other party. If the electronic agent is a legal person, then the prospect arises of
a lawsuit against the agent. But what relief could be made available in such a lawsuit?
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Obviously, an electronic agent does not have any assets. 222 It is difficult to identify sanctions
that could be imposed on it.
To address this accountability problem, it has been proposed that agency software be
insured to satisfy legal judgments. 223 In this hypothesis, an insurance payment would be
made by the human controller, and the insurer who would end up paying (in other words
being responsible) for losses caused by the electronic agent. And the interest in using legal
personality would be lost.224 In addition, there may be a problem regarding the identification
of the electronic agent.225 What is the person? The software itself? The hardware? And what
if the two are in different places? Some have proposed a system of registration, similar to
what is done for corporations. 226 The natural or artificial person who wants to use an
electronic agent would have to register it first. This way, in the event of litigation, it would be
possible to know who the person behind the agent is. Here, once again, the advantage of
deeming electronic agents legal persons seems minimal, since the system of registration
would have the ultimate purpose of finding another person (the registrant) responsible for the
electronic agent. It would essentially impose strict liability on the registrant for the wrongful
(unauthorized) actions of its electronic agent.

ii.

France

French law is divided into public and private laws. Both may recognize artificial
persons, but the requirements for acquiring legal personhood are different. This paper focuses
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only on the creation of legal personality in private law. 227 Like American law, French law
recognizes various sorts of artificial persons. Companies, associations and economic
organizations 228 may be deemed legal persons with rights and obligations. 229 The creation of
the artificial person generally 230 must be made by a written contract executed by one or more
human beings. This contract must be published. Without the formality of publication, legal
personality will not be extended to the entity. 231 It is not impossible to imagine a similar
system for electronic agents. An agent’s owner would have to register it and publicize the
registration. The system of publicity has the purpose of protecting other persons who might
do business with the entity. A system of registration when applied to electronic agents would
create a safer environment and might persuade individuals to rely on these agents. On the
other hand, the attribution of legal personality to the electronic agent might shift liability
away from the agent’s owner, undermining any advantage created by a system of
registration. In addition, another difficulty appears. In French law, the attributes of physical
persons are not applicable to artificial entities. 232 Nonetheless, legal personality in both cases
implies the existence of a patrimony. 233 Patrimony refers to the duties and rights that have an
economic value. 234 To calculate the patrimony of a person, one must look at the person’s
assets and debts. 235 Neither electronic agents nor computers in general have a patrimony.
They are actually part of another person’s patrimony. Without the existence of personal
assets, French law is likely to refuse the recognition of legal personality to electronic agents.
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b.

Agent

Another possible solution would be to see the robot as an agent of its owner. This
seems to be the most natural approach, but if we view electronic agents under traditional
agency principals, we see that the analogy is not perfect. There are fundamental differences
between real and electronic agents, and current agency law would have to be modified to
accommodate those differences.

i.

The United States

Use of the term “electronic agent” can be misleading to lawyers and judges, because
it suggests the applicability of the traditional law governing principals and agents.236 This
section of the paper takes up the question of the suitability of principal- and-agent doctrines in
the context of electronic agents. The discussion avoids the use of the term “electronic agent”
and uses instead such terms as software programs.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, agency refers to the relationship
between an agent and a principal. An agent is someone who, with the consent of a principal,
agrees to act on the behalf of the latter and under his control. 237 Under agency law, an agent
may have the power to contract on behalf of the principal. 238 In order for the principal to be
bound by the agent’s actions, the latter must have autho rity from the former.239 If a contract
is concluded by an agent who has no authority to do so, the contract has no effect on the
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principal. 240 Authority is defined as “the power of an agent to bind the principal by acts done
in accordance with the principal’s manifestations of consent” 241 and may be actual or
apparent. 242
Actual authority is given through oral or written instructions and usually includes socalled “implied authority, 243 defined as the authority to perform acts that are incidental to the
main transaction or necessary to carry it.

244

Not every related action falls under implied

authority, and the standard of reasonableness is used to decide whether the agent has acted
within his powers.245 Implied authority also may allow the agent to delegate parts of his task
to sub-agents. 246
Apparent authority, on the other hand, does not result directly from the principal’s
instructions, but “is derived from the circumstances of a situation.”247 The focus is on third
parties’ reasonable perceptions.248 If a third party reasonably believes, based on the
principal’s behavior in the circumstances, that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the
principal, the principal will be bound by the agent’s actions.249 The principal may seek relief
from the agent, but he or she still will be responsible to third parties. 250 The purpose is to
allow an innocent third-party to recover from the principal when he or she is misled, either
intentionally or negligently. 251
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At first glance, it seems convenient and somehow logical to apply agency principles
to the human–software relationship:
When computers are given the capacity to communicate with each
other based upon preprogrammed instructions, and when they
possess the physical capability to execute agreements on shipments
of goods without any human awareness or input into the
agreements beyond the original programming of the computer's
instructions, these computers serve the same function as similarly
instructed human agents of a party and thus should be treated
under the law identically to those human agents. 252
The rule seems simple. When a human being uses a software program as a mere tool, the
software should be treated as a tool, analogous to a fax machine or other communication
device, 253 but when a human actor uses a software program as he or she would use a human
agent, the software should be treated as the law treats a human agent. 254 Agency doctrines,
however, cannot be applied in a straightforward way to transactions involving software
programs. First, as already noted, agency requires the consent of both parties, the principal
and the agent. 255 While it has been argued that an individual who uses a software to conclude
contracts gives actual authority to the program to do so, 256 the problem regarding the consent
of the agent remains. 257 The agent must give consent because agency implies rights and
duties. 258 Hence, most authors 259 recognize that “[i]n a principal-computer-agent relationship,
the concept of the computer consenting is absurd.”260 If software programs can act according
to their owners’ instructions, it cannot be said that they are under legal obligation to do so or
that they consent to act according to the human’s wishes.261 Some writers 262 therefore opt for
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the use of a presumption or a legal fiction of consent, 263 at least until it can be said that
softwares can give consent.
In addition, assuming the problem of consent can be solved, the question of the agent’s
responsibility remains. Under agency law, the principal cannot be held responsible for his
agent’s actions, if the latter does not act according to the former’s mandate.264 In this case, the
agent will be liable for his wrongdoing. 265 As has been discussed earlier, 266 robots are not
capable at law (at least not yet) and therefore, they cannot be held liable for their acts. It is
easy to see the possible difficulties that might arise from such a concept. For instance, if
because of a malfunction in the program, the robot enters into a contract for which the human
trader has not given any instructions, the human actor may claim that his agent did not act
within his mandate and the other party may be left without any relief. That is why it has been
argued that “[b]ots may be programmed to do all […] things, but a malfunction is not a breach
of a legal duty. A principal would be legally responsible for the acts of the electronic agent,
even those that resulted from program malfunction.” 267 Indeed, the principal’s liability may
extend to other robots. It has been noted earlier268 that actual authority may include authority
to perform incidental acts, and even power to delegate parts of the tasks to sub-agents.
Technologies are now being developed that enable the collaboration of several robots. 269
Therefore, the principal could be bound by transactions concluded by other robots. Thus, one
may wonder about the pertinence of applying agency principles to bot–human actor
relationships. After all, if the human trader must be responsible for every robot’s act, what is
the interest in deeming the robot an agent? 270 On the other hand, if agency principles are
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enforceable and the principal may avoid liability for his agent’s actions, what remedy is
available to the other party? Apparent authority is perhaps the solution.
When a human actor uses a robot to conduct transactions, he seems to give the clear
impression to the other party that the robot is his agent. 271 In this case, the courts will hold
him liable even for his agent’s unauthorized acts 272 and the innocent third party will be
protected. However, apparent authority is based on third parties’ perceptions, and as we have
seen earlier in this analysis, it is possible for a party who enters into a contract with an
electronic agent simply to believe he or she is conducting a transaction with the human actorprincipal directly. 273 In addition, the owner must do more than use the robot; he must make it
clear that the computer is his agent.274
Thus, existing agency principles seem inadequate for the use of robots in contracting.
Perhaps the solution is the use of the legal fiction that robots are agents as some authors 275
have suggested. Or maybe robots should be a new kind of agent, with specific rules. 276 In
deciding whether agency law is an adequate system for the relationship between human trader
and robot, one should bear in mind the purpose of agency. Agency aims to govern a
relationship between two individuals, who possess free will and who, therefore, may act on
their own. Agency has the objective of protecting the agent acting on behalf of his principal,
while restricting the principal’s responsibility. Finally, agency tries to make sure that the
innocent third party will be offered an appropriate remedy. The use of robots presents similar
concerns, minus the protection of the robot itself of course. 277 In evaluating the correct set of
legal rules, one wants to find a just balance between the protection of the third party and the
limitation of responsibility of the owner. Agency law seems to offer this. Nonetheless, once
271
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again, the main issue remains--the robot’s lack of patrimony. In the traditional world, when
the principal is not held liable, the third-party may still seek relief from the agent. In parallel,
if the principal is responsible, he may turn to his agent for recovery. In the world of robots,
such a system cannot work. Indeed, even if the robot is recognized as solely responsible for
the wrongdoing, there is no remedy for the winning party. We will develop later the possible
solutions for the human parties in such cases. 278 Nonetheless, it must be noted here that if
agency principles are applied to robots, one of the human parties (the principal or the third
party or perhaps a party outside the contractual relationship 279) will have to bear the risk of
malfunction by the robot.

ii.

France

When studying whether robots can be deemed agents under French law, one must first
analyze the concept of agency in the Civil Code.280 Title XIII 281 provides the following
definition of agency: “an act whereby one person gives to another the power to do something
for the principal in his name.”282 There has been almost no modification of the law of agency
since 1804. 283 However, the use of agency in the conduct of business has increased
considerably and individuals now exercise the function of agent as a regular profession. 284
Several types of agency exist. First, an agent may act in the principal’s name or on behalf of
the principal while concealing the principal’s identity (mandat représentatif and mandat non
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représentatif).285 Second and more common, the agent may introduce himself as working for
the principal, and third parties know that they are conducting business with the principal,
through the agent.286 In addition, differentiation must be made between salaried and gratuitous
agencies. 287 Since salaried agency cannot apply to robots (unless the robot is supplied by a
third party for a fee),288 we will not develop it here289 and will focus our analysis on gratuitous
agency.
In order for the principal-agent relationship to exist, the law requires acceptance by the
agent.290 As in American law, this condition seems to raise a difficulty as to the application of
agency principles to robots. Article 1985291 states that the “[a]cceptance of an agency may be
only tacit and result from the execution given to it by the agent.” 292 Does this mean that robots
are able to give tacit acceptance? After all, when given instructions to negotiate and conclude
an agreement, they do so and therefore behave as agents according to Article 1985. When the
drafters of the Civil Code envisioned agency law, it is clear that they did not have in mind the
role that robots would play someday. Legislatures, courts and legal experts293 have not spoken
on the topic yet. Therefore, the question is whether a robot is capable of contracting since by
its acceptance a contract of agency would be formed between the human actor and the robot.
Article 1123 294 states that “[a]ny person may contract, if he has not been declared incapable
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thereof by law.” 295 Thus, it must be decided whether a robot is a person by law and as we
have developed earlier,296 French law may not be ready to recognize such an idea. However,
the Code allows the principal to give power to a non-emancipated minor,297 who is usually not
considered a legal person under the law. 298 Nonetheless, according to the authors, 299 agency
requires legal capacity. Minors, as well as married women before 1965, 300 can be chosen as
agents because they are supposedly not bound by their own acts. 301 The principal has to
answer for the agent’s actions.302 Moreover, the minor agent is not responsible for his
mistakes as a capable agent would be. The principal is usually not able to seek relief from the
minor agent. 303
One may argue that robots are like minors. They are not legal entities but they can still
engage the principal in legal transactions. Even assuming the law may someday accept this
theory, the question whether agency is the appropriate framework for analyzing the legal
status of robots remains. As in American law, there is an issue concerning the responsibility
of the agent. The agent may have power to conclude a specific agreement or a series of
contracts. 304 If the agent acts within his authority, the principal will be responsible for the
agent.305 On the other hand, “[h]e is not held to what could have been done further except as
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he so ratified expressly or impliedly.”306 If the agent exceeds his authority, then he may be
responsible for his own actions to the third party. 307 It will depend on the knowledge of the
third party. If she or he knew the agent’s limitations of authority, the third party cannot seek
relief from the agent on this ground. 308 However, if she or he did not know, the agent will be
responsible for the damages caused to this innocent third party309 and the contract will not be
enforceable. 310 In addition, the capable agent is also responsible for the damages caused to his
principal when he exceeds his power or makes a mistake.311 Should a robot’s malfunction be
considered a mistake? If because of a virus the computer concludes the wrong contract, can
the principal avoid the payment of damages to the innocent third party claiming relief based
on the agent’s mistake? In the real world, the system works because the party may still seek
relief from the wrongdoer. In cyberspace, the computer may neither assume responsibility for
its own mistakes nor provide just relief to its victims. Nonetheless, the system applied to
minor agents seems to raise the same kind of issues so we could analogize robots to minor
agents. The drafters and courts in general have simply decided to extend the responsibility of
the principal to cover all the acts of a minor agent. After all, if the principal chooses an
incapable as agent, he should be the one bearing the risk and not the innocent third party. It is
interesting to note that relief is available for the principal when this third party is not innocent
and knows the agent does not have authority to act on behalf of the principal. The same rules
could apply to robot agents.
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c.

Communication Tool

The last possible solution regarding electronic agents would be to consider them as
mere communication tools. In this model, the role played by the robot would be simply
ignored and every contract concluded by an electronic agent would be attributable to his
owner. 312 The robot would be treated as a fax machine or a telephone, 313 the medium by
which the contract is concluded. As a result, we would have to disregard the importance of the
electronic agent in the conclusion of the transaction and ignore its autonomy. “We would
adopt the legal fiction that anything issuing from the computer really issues directly from its
human controller.”314
This approach has the advantage of solving several difficulties. First, there is no need
to change the existing rules of contracting, 315 since the contract would still be formed between
two recognized legal persons. In addition, this solution would place the burden upon the user
of the electronic agent, which according to some authors,316 is a fair allocation of
responsibility. The user made the choice to delegate his power to a robot. Therefore, if the
other party does not even know that he or she contracts with an agent, making the user liable
for his agent’s actions appears to be fair and just.317 Moreover, this view seems to be shared
by some courts. In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 318 held an insurance
company liable for a mistake, which was claimed to ha ve been made by the company’s
computer system. 319 In this case, 320 an individual (Bockhorst ) failed to pay his insurance
policy. When he had an accident one morning and killed a pedestrian, he sent a check for the
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amount of the late payments. A controversy over insurance coverage arose. Meanwhile, the
check was received at the financial branch and entered into the computer. The computer,
which had received no notification of the accident, reinstated the insurance.321 Bockhorst
claimed he was covered, while the insurance company later argued it was only a computer
mistake.322 Deciding in favor of Bockhorst, the court stated:323
Holding a company responsible for the actions of its computer does
not exhibit a distaste for modern business practices as [the
insurance compa ny] asserts. A computer operates only in
accordance with the information and directions supplied by its
human programmers. If the computer does not think like a man, it
is man's fault. The reinstatement of Bockhorst's policy was the
direct result of the er rors and oversights of [the insurance
company]'s human agents and employees. The fact that the actual
processing of the policy was carried out by an unimaginative
mechanical device can have no effect on the company's
responsibilities for those errors and oversights. [The insurance
company]'s reinstatement of Bockhorst's policy while in full
possession of information establishing its right to refuse
reinstatement constituted a binding waiver, and the reinstated
policy effectively extended coverage for the pe riod during which
Bockhorst's accident occurred. 324

Thus, according to this approach, the user of the computer has an interest in making
sure that his or her computer is properly programmed and policed.325 Nonetheless, it cannot
be denied that computers are able now to be autonomous and that their degree of autonomy
could increase in the near future. Accordingly, this approach seems to put on the user a heavy
burden. For instance, what if the other party knew or had reason to know about the
unexpected communication? Should this party not be held liable for entering into such an
agreement? Is it fair to hold responsible the user in case of a malfunction due to a virus or a
negligent third party? The “strict liability” approach of the Tenth Circuit seems to provide no
321
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adequate remedy in such cases. 326 Electronic agents are used because they are convenient and
efficient. They allow their users to save time and money. Developing an absolute liability
scheme and unnecessary duties may prevent traders from using these new tools.

2.

Manifestation of Assent

In addition to the legal capacity issues discussed above, a main concern regarding the
use of electronic agents is whether they can manifest the assent necessary for the formation of
a contract. Laws in the United States and France provide different approaches to the
manifestation of assent. Thus, they will be studied separately.

a.

The U.S. Approach or Objective Theory

According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 327 a contract is “a promise or a
set of promises.” 328 This promise is expressed by a party, usually through words, although it
may be also inferred from his conduct. 329 A party’s subjective assent is not necessary to make
a contract.330 The manifestation of intention only matters.331 Thus, the inquiry will not foc us
on whether the minds of the parties have met, but rather whether the manifestation of assent is
sufficient to form the contract.332 Two conditions are required in order for an obligation to be
created. First, there must be a promise, that is, a “manifesta tion of intent that justifies a
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promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”333 Second, each party’s
manifestation of assent must be made with reference to the manifestation of the other.334
The use of electronic agents could be seen as an act of conduct. 335 A traditional
example of an act of conduct would be the case in which a customer has an account with a
shop or store. If he takes a fruit and shows it to the clerk, his conduct is characterized as an
offer.336 Subsequently, if the clerk nods, there is acceptance and a contract is formed. 337
However, using an electronic agent is quite different from this example. When using an
electronic agent to conduct a transaction, the user is not aware of the agreement until his agent
concludes the transaction. 338 Yet, the Restatement states that “[t]he conduct of a party is not
effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and
knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he
assents.”339 Therefore, with respect to electronic agents, the question comes down to whether
a reasonable person would believe that assent has been manifested by the other party, the
party who chose to use the robot. We might conclude that since the user chooses to send his
agent into cyberspace with instructions to conclude a certain type of transaction, he has
manifested assent to be bound by his agent’s actions. Once again, this view seems to be harsh
on the user. Adopting such a theory would bind the user for every co ntract entered into by his
electronic agent.
In addition, some 340 think that this problem must be seen in a different way and that
the inquiry should focus on the electronic agent’s manifestation of assent rather than the
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user’s assent through his electronic agent.341 Therefore, the reasonable person standard
regarding the other party’s intention becomes relevant:342
[T]his might be correct in so far as the transaction is understood as
an agreement that is merely mediated by one or more electronic
devices. In such case, whatever his real intention may be, the party
employing the electronic device would be conducting himself in
such a way that a reasonable man would believe that he was
assenting to the terms proposed by the other party. But the above
analysis is in correct in circumstances where an offer can be said to
be initiated by the electronic device autonomously, i.e. in a manner
unknown or unpredicted by the party employing the electronic
device. Here it cannot be said that the party employing the
electronic device has conducted himself such that a reasonable
person would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed
by the other party. As odd as it may seem to us – given our
primitive state of agent technology – there will come a time when a
electronic device will appear to conduct itself such that a
reasonable person would believe that the device was assenting to
the terms proposed by the other party. 343
In dealing with the issue, the drafters of the UCITA 344 officially recognize the ability
of electronic agents to manifest assent. 345 Accordingly, an “electronic agent manifests assent
to a record or term if, after having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent
authenticates the record or term; or engages in operations that in circumstances indicate
acceptance of the record or term.” 346 In addition, a party may prove that an electronic agent
manifested assent in any manner. 347 Notably, a party may show that a processing procedure
existed which the electronic agent must have executed in order for processing to be
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complete. 348 Thus, the application of the UCITA nationwide could solve any controversy that
might arise from traditional contract principles regarding assent.

b.

The French Approach or Subjective Theory

The law of contracts in France has been built on the freedom of the individual. 349 The
theory of the autonomy of the will was taken as the foundation of contractual doctrine in the
nineteenth century. 350 Accordingly, a contractual obligation can exist only if the other party
has willed it.351 On the other hand, because the parties are supposed to enter freely into a
contract, “[a]greements legally made take the place of law for those who make them.” 352 This
approach led to the development of the supremacy of the inner will. 353 When deciding
whether a party inte nded to bind himself, the courts have to look at his inner will and not only
at his declared will. 354 However, this theory has been vigorously cr iticized by the French legal
scholars over the past decades. 355 Today, the application of the autonomy of will has
numerous exceptions, often to protect the weaker party in the transaction.356
With respect to electronic agents, when the traditional doctrine applies (i.e., when
analysis of the inner will of the party is the correct inquiry to determine whether a contract
was formed), difficulties arise. The will must be formed prior to or simultaneous with the
negotiations. If one uses an electronic agent, when can we look at his inner state of mind? The
348

Id.
See B ARRY NICHOLAS , FRENCH LAW OF C ONTRACT 31 (Butterworths, 1982).
350
Id.
351
C. CIV., art. 1108: “Four conditions are essential for the validity of an agreement: The consent of the party
who obligates himself; His capacity to contract; An object certain which forms the subject matter of the
engagement; A licit causa in the obligation” ; see also CRABB, supra note 282, at 218.
352
C. CIV, art. 1134; see also CRABB, supra note 282, at 221.
353
Volonté interne or volonté réelle.
354
MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL – T OME II – 1ER VOL. – L ES OBLIGATIONS 79 (Sirey : Paris 1962).
355
See M AZEAUD, MAZEAUD & CHABAS , LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL – TOME II -1ER VOL. OBLIGATIONS : THÉORIE
GÉNÉRALE 105 (7th ed., Ed. Montchrestien, Paris 1985); see also ROLAND & BOYER, OBLIGATIONS , T OME II,
CONTRAT (Litec, 5th ed.,1995).
356
TOULET , DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS, R ESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 37 (Centre de Publications Universitaires,
1998) (talking about the protection of consumers or persons in debts).
349

47

user of an electronic agent will not know the agent negotiated a contract before the robot
completed its task. Therefore, even though the human controller may give his assent, this will
not happen prior to or simultaneously with the negotiations. In addition, should we look at the
inner will of the electronic agent itself as has been suggested earlier in this analysis regarding
the objective approach? 357 Free will may hardly be attributed to a robot. 358
On the other hand, if the critics of the autonomy of will prevail and a more objective
approach is adopted, then the discussion regarding the possible validity of contracts concluded
by electronic agents under French law would be the same as under U.S. law.
Although the European Directive on Electronic Commerce 359 requires every European
State to validate contracts concluded through electronic agents, the French legislature has not
adopted any positive regulation regarding the use of electronic agents, unlike the United
States. 360 Therefore, the situation is one of transition where such contracts are declared valid
but where in the absence of specific rules traditional contract principles must regulate these
agreements. This may not be the best solution. In the last part of this analysis, some of the
possible issues arising from the use of electronic agents will be developed and studied under
existing laws.
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CHAPTER 4
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

As has been stated earlier in this analysis, the recently adopted provisions, whether
European or American, do not always provide answers regarding the legal effects that flow
from the formation of contracts concluded by electronic agents. The following shows several
issues that may arise and the possible remedies.

A.

The Terms of the Contract

1.

Parol Evidence Rule

Section 2-202 of the UCC361 states the parol evidence rule in contracts for the sa le of
goods. This section was modified with the proposed revisions of May 2003,362 but the
substance of the article remains the same. According to the parol evidence rule,
[w]hen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as to the complete and
accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
writing. 363
Thus, if the agreement was integrated, extrinsic evidence cannot be received. An agreement
is integrated when it represents the final expression of the parties’ agreement regarding the
terms in such record.364 Therefore, to determine whether there was integration, the courts will
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look at the intention of the parties. 365 In addition, the integration may be complete or partial.
Extrinsic evidence may not be used to add to or modify the terms of an agreement (full
integration), or parol evidence may be received to prove certain elements of the contract only
(partial integration) .366 It must be noted also that while an integration or merger clause is
some evidence of integration, it is not conclusive. 367 In addition, the absence of a merger
clause in a writing does not necessarily permit the use of extrinsic evidence.368 Thus, the
question of whether the parol evidence rule should apply is really one of circumstances, and
the courts will look at different factors, such as the existence of a merger clause and the
sophistication of the parties.369
With respect to the use of electronic agents, the parol evidence rule seems difficult to
apply. 370 In the traditional world, courts already proceed with caution as to the application of
the rule.371 In the case of a contract concluded through electronic agents, parties do not have
the opportunity to review the terms prior to the formation of the agreement and a court is
unlikely to decide a party intended to be bound by the terms of an agreement he or she did
not have the chance to review or app rove. 372 Indeed, it is particularly true when such a
conclusion would prevent the party from introducing extrinsic evidence regarding the making
of the agreement. 373 Therefore, courts may “be compelled to conclude that agreements made
by electronic agents without review or approval by individuals can never demonstrate an
intent that such agreement be a final expression of the terms of the agreement.” 374
365
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A related issue concerns the so-called “battle of the forms” that occurs when parties
exchange standard contract forms but neither party expressly agrees to the other’s form.
Prior to the May 2003 revisions,375 a party could limit acceptance of his offer only to terms
contained in his proposed form. 376 The other party could make his acceptance conditional to
the offe ror’s acceptance of new terms in his own form. 377 It is not clear how electronic agents
could object to non-matching terms, and what the legal effect of such an objection would be.
Under the new §2-207, the issue is simplified. O ne party’s terms do not become part of the
contract, if the other party’s form does not contain the same terms. 378 Thus, electronic agents
would not have to object to non-matching terms in order to keep them out of the
agreement.379

2.

French Solution

As has been seen earlier, 380 in French law, contracts are considered the “law for those
who make them,”381 and the intention of the parties is the foundation of the principles
governing contracts. Thus, not surprisingly, the Civil Code provides that “[t]he common
intention of the contracting parties must be sought in agreements rather than merely the literal
meaning of terms.” 382 And when the contract is clear and unambiguous, the judge must
respect the agreement as to the result of the parties’ intentions. 383 On the other hand, if the
contract is ambiguous or if a difficulty arises from its terms, the court will interpret the
agreement according to the parties’ intentions as they were on the day of the conclusion of the
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agreement.384 In order to determine the common intention of the parties, the judge will take
into account various factors, such as the negotiations, and the parties’ behavior prior to or
after the conclusion of the contract. 385 Thus, regarding the contracts concluded by electronic
agents, the French courts may struggle like American courts to find the common intention of
the parties.
In addition, according to the French law of contracts, a party is bound by the terms of
an agreement, if he has had the opportunity to review these terms. 386 If a party has had the
opportunity to review the agree ment, he cannot claim he actually did not read it in order to
avoid its application. 387 When one or two electronic agents have concluded a contract, there is
no opportunity to review the terms. Hence, according to traditional contract principles, the
party using an electronic agent will not be legally bound by the terms of the agreement until
he has had an opportunity to see it. However, with the new European Directive on Electronic
Commerce, 388 Member States must “ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the
contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of electronic contracts nor result in
such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having
been made by electronic means.”389 Existing French law obviously deprives of effectiveness
contracts concluded through electronic agents if it allows the party–user to claim he has not
had the opportunity to review the terms of the agreement. The European Directive preempts
differing French laws so even though the Directive has not been transposed yet in France, 390
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individuals may still invoke it before national courts.391 France is still working on the
transposition392 and this issue could be soon resolved.

B.

The Avoidance Doctrines

The use of electronic agents may result in unintentional contractual relationships.
Since contracting by electronic agents effectively dispenses with the bargaining process,
undue influence and duress will probably not be invoked to get out of a contract concluded by
bots. Nevertheless, a claim for mistake or fraud could be asserted. The question is whether the
traditional views regarding those defenses could be applied to electronic agents.

1.

Mistake

a.

In the United States

A mistake may be defined as “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.” 393 As the
courts have stated, “a mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance,
surprise, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material, that is, so substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.”394 It is usually used as a defense to avoid
an otherwise enforceable contract.395 To be ground for cessation, the mistake must have
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occurred at the time the contract was made. 396 There are two types of mistake: mutual or
unilateral.
Mutual mistake results when both part ies to a contract share a basic assumption
regarding an important element of the alleged contract and that assumption happens to be
false. 397 As developed by the courts,398 mutual mistake requires four elements. First, “the
parties to a contract were mistaken in their belief regarding a fact.”399 The fact must exist at
the time the contract is made. Future events may be used to avoid the contract under other
theories such as impossibility, 400 impracticability 401 or frustration of purpose, 402 but the
doctrine of mistake does not provide any relief for events that occur later. Second, “the
mistake constitutes a basic assumption underlying the contract.” 403 Third, “the mistake had a
material effect on the bargain.” 404 This requirement means that mistakes that have a minor
effect on the transaction cannot be used to avoid the contract. Finally, “the contract did not
put the risk of the mistake on the party alleging mistake.”405 Generally speaking, if mutual
mistake results in “a quite different exchange of values”406 than what the parties thought at the
time the agreement was made, 407 then the contract is voidable (cancelled) or reformable
(modified). 408
There is unilateral mistake when only one party was mistaken at the time the contract
was made.409 In order to prove unilateral mistake, the party who has been allegedly mistaken
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must prove the four elements required for mutual mistake. 410 In addition, the party must also
prove either that the effect of the mistake causes the contract to be unconscionable or that the
other party knew or had reason to know about the mistake. 411 It must be noted that a unilateral
mistake will usually not enable a party to avoid the contract. 412 Nonetheless, there may be
rescission or modification for unilateral mistake, if there has been “fraud, misrepresentation,
or other misconduct.” 413
A party may obtain relief under unilateral mistake if this party can show that the other
knew or had reason to know about the mistake at the time the contract was made. 414 Whether
the other party knew or had reason to know is a case-by-case question. 415 If it cannot be
proved that the other party knew or had reason to know of the mistake, the mistaken party still
has the possibility of obtaining relief by proving that enforcement of the contract would be
unconscionable. 416 Unconscionability may be a defense by itself.417 Nonetheless, the level
necessary in order to obtain relief for unilateral mistake seems less burdensome.418 The courts
will look at the result of performance. For instance, they will inquire whether performance
would cause a loss for the mistaken party and if so, how important the loss would be.
With respect to electronic agents, the first concern is the fact that the mistake (mutual
or unilateral) must have occurred at the time the agreement was made. According to the new
provisions of the UCC,419 the time of contracting corresponds to the time when the accepting
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electronic transmission is sent.420 In addition, section 2-204 allows the formation of contracts
concluded by electronic agents, even if no individual was aware of the age nt’s actions. 421
Thus, the courts will have to decide whether parties had any mistaken beliefs about the
agreement or its terms at a point in time when they may not even have known that a contract
had been formed. 422
In addition, it has been stated that a party may not seek relief for mistake if he bears
the risk of mistake. 423 A party bears the risk of mistake when the risk is allocated to him or
her by agreement of the parties. 424 Furthermore, a party bears the risk of mistake if the party is
aware, at the time the contract is made, that he or she has only limited knowledge with respect
to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats this limited knowledge as sufficient. 425
Finally, a party bears the risk of mistake if the court allocates it to him or her on the ground
that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.426 For some,427 the fact that a person chose
to contract through electronic agents means that the party proceeds “with knowledge that in
all likelihood he will not know that a contract is being formed, not to mention the actual terms
of the contract.”428 This could be characterized as conscious ignorance and therefore
acceptance of any mistakes that follow. In addition, the UETA429 tries to set rules regarding
errors. 430 However, the Act only deals with human errors in automated transactions and it
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does not refer to errors by electronic agents, such as a malfunction. According to the UETA,
in cases not described by the Act, the common law of mistake must be applied. 431
Thus, courts may be willing to decide it is reasonable to allocate the risk of mistake to
the party–user of the electronic agent. Such a position would be consistent with the courts’
decisions regarding transmission errors.432 In Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 433 a mistake
occurred in a telegram and the offeree accepted for a price far below the one intended by the
offeror. The court decided that the telegraph company made the mistake but that the party
choosing the telegraph to communicate should bear the risk. The court held that:
the safer and more equitable rule, and the rule the public can most
easily adapt itself to, is that, as between sender and receiver, the
party who selects the telegraph as the means of communication
shall bear the loss caused by the errors of the telegraph. The first
proposer can select one of many modes of communication, both
for the proposal and the answer. The receiver has no such choice,
except as to his answer. If he cannot safely act upon the message
he receives through the agency selected by the proposer, business
must be seriously hampered and delayed. The use of the telegraph
has become so general, and so many transactions are based on the
words of the telegram received, that any other rule would now be
impracticable .
Accordingly, a similar approach could be taken for the use of electronic agents. The party
using an electronic agent would be deemed to bear the risk of mistake and would not be able
to obtain relief under the doctrine of mistake. This reasoning may seem appropriate in the
(2) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the effect of an electronic
record that resulted from an error made by the individual in dealing with the electronic agent of another
person if the electronic agent did not provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error
and, at the time the individual learns of the error, the individual:
(a) promptly notifies the other person of the error and that the individual did not intend to be
bound by the electronic record received by the other person;
(b) takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other person’s reasonable
instructions, to return to the other person or, if instructed by the other person, to destroy the
consideration received, if any, as a result of the erroneous electronic record; and
(c) has not used or received a ny benefit or value from the consideration, if any, received from the
other person.
(3) If neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) applies, the change or error has the effect provided by other law,
including the law of mistake, and the parties’ contract, if any.
(4) Paragraphs (2) and (3) may not be varied by agreement.”
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transactions conducted between professionals but it seems harsh for a consumer who may not
have a very good understanding of electronic agents’ technology. 434 If this risk allocation is
accepted, the only possible application of the mistake doctrine would be when both parties
are using electronic agents. If both agents were operating under mistaken assumptions, then
the contract might be voided because of mutual mistake. Similarly, if the agreement resulted
in an unconscionable bargain, the doctrine of unilateral mistake might provide relief.

b.

In France

Article 1108 of the Civil Code states that a contract is validly formed only if four
conditions are met: the subject matter of the contract must be certain, the “cause” of the duty
must be legal, the parties must be capable of contracting, and there must be valid consent. 435
According to the doctrine of the autonomy of the will, 436 consent is the key element in the
formation of contracts 437 and, to be binding, an agreement must have been freely made. 438 In
order for the contract to be enforceable, consent needs not only to exist but also to be without
defect. 439 Mistake or erreur is one of the three defects that may void consent.440 Article 1109
of the Civil Code provides that there is no valid consent if consent has been given only by
mistake or if it has been extorted by violence or obtained by deceit. 441 Therefore, if there is no
valid consent, there is no valid agreement and the contract will be held void.
Mistake may be defined as a false assumption of facts. 442 Beyond that basic definition,
there are several types of mistakes. Some are mentioned by the Civil Code,443 while others
434
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have been developed by the legal scholars in secondary sources. 444 The Code445 envisions
only two kinds of mistake (erreur sur la substance and erreur sur la personne) under the
general category of erreur-nullité , that is, a mistake that raises the nullity of the agreement.
The first category is erreur sur la substance. The language of the Article 1110446 is very
vague. 447 It states that the mistake must relate to the “very substance of the thing which is the
object of the agreement.” 448 The word “substance” has been subject to various
interpretations. 449 The courts have talked about “determining consideration” 450 or “the quality
without which the buyer would not have bought.”451 Once agree ing upon the definition,
authors still diverge on whether the “substantial quality” should be seen in abstracto or in
concreto.452 In abstracto means the quality is substantial if it is the quality expected in general
for this particular kind of thing. For instance, when a car is bought, the tires are expected to be
reliable. On the other hand, if the quality is viewed in concreto , one must look for the exact
quality the party intended to receive. Therefore, the party alleging mistake bears the burden of
proving that the absent quality was envisioned by the parties at the time the contract was
made.453 In the event the seller did not know the specific quality expected by the buyer at the
time of contracting, nullity of the contract cannot be claimed.454 Once again, while applying
the theory to electronic agents, one would meet difficulties. In the world of electronic agents,
buyer and seller do not know each other. Therefore, the party alleging the mistake will hardly
be able to prove the other party knew what his expectations were at the time of contracting.
443

C. CIV., art. 1110.
See Mazeaud & Chabas for instance.
445
C. CIV., art. 1110: “Error is cause of nullity of an agreement only when it touches the very substance of the
thing which is its object. It is not a cause of nullity when it touches only the person with whom there was the
intention to contract, unless considerations concerning such person were the principal reason for the agreement.”
446
Id.
447
TOULET , supra note 356, at 61.
448
NICHOLAS , supra note 349 at 80.
449
TOULET , supra note 355, at 61.
450
Cass. civ., 17.11.1930, S 1932.1.17 note Breton. It must be noted here that the term consideration has not in
French law the same meaning and consequences that it has in American law.
451
Orléans 21.1.1931, DH 1931.172.
452
TOULET , supra note 356, at 62.
453
Id.
454
Id.
444

59

The second category of erreur-nullité is the mistake as to the person (erreur sur la
personne). The Civil Code 455 states that a mistake as to the person with whom one intends to
contract is not a cause of nullity “unless the consideration of this person is the principal cause
of the agreement.” 456 This type of contract is called intuitu personae.457 Intuitu personae
contracts are rare when it comes to contracts for sale because one is usually willing to contract
with anyone as long as the object and conditions are the same. This category does not offer
any particular relevance for electronic agents, besides the fact that an individual may not be
able to claim there is no contract because he did not know he was contracting with an
electronic agent.
The concept of erreur-obstacle is doctrinal. 458 There is no express mention of it in the
Civil Code. Because of the mistake, the wills of the parties never met and therefore no
contract has been formed. 459 Writers 460 have distinguished three cases in which mistake bars
the formation of a contract: mistake as to the nature of the contract, mistake as to the identity
of the thing object of the contract, and mistake as to the existence of the contract itself. 461
First, mistake may be ma de when parties do not think they enter into the same nature of
transaction. For instance, one party may think the contract is one of sale when it is actually a
mere exchange or lease. 462 Then, there may be mistake as to the nature of the thing which is
the object of the contract. Both parties have a different view of the thing. For example, in
some older cases, the contract may have asked for payment of 1,000 francs. One party thought
the contract referred to new francs and the other to old francs. 463 Finally, there may be erreur-
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obstacle as to the existence of the contract. The famous illustration is the case464 in which a
man commited to pay child support for a child he thought was his son. The child was actually
not his. The court held that the man did not have any obligation and entered into the contract
for a false reason. 465
The question of mistake is really one of circumstances. Thus, the courts will have
power to decide whether a mistake occurred and if so, under which category it falls. This is
particularly relevant because of the remedy available according to the nature of the mistake.
French law distinguishes between two kinds of nullity: “absolute nullity” and “relative
nullity.”466 The main difference concerns the category of people the legislature tries to
protect. 467 In the first case, the general interest is involved. The irregularity of the contract is
so important that people in general must be protected and prevented from relying on such an
agreement. In a case of relative nullity, protection of one of the parties is sought. The doctrine
protects a particular interest. In any event, the nullity must be recognized and declared by a
judge. 468 Thus, as long as the judge has not pronounced the nullity, the contract has the
appearance of a valid agreement. 469 In addition, the persons able to raise the nullity are
different in the case of relative nullity. If the nullity is absolute, anybody who has an interest
in doing so can go before the court. In the event the nullity is relative, only the party who is
the victim of the mistake can ask the judge to pronounce the nullity of the contract. 470 In
addition, the period of limitation is not the same. The limitation is five years for relative
nullity and thirty years in a case of absolute nullity. 471 Furthermore, it must be noted that if the
nullity is only relative, the victim of the mistake can waive his right for nullity. This action,
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called “confirmation,” makes the contract valid retroactively. 472 Confirmation may be express
or tacit, 473 but the intent of the party must be real and certain. 474 Confirmation is not possible
in the event of absolute nullity. 475
Another distinction between erreur-nullité and erreur-obstacle must be made here.
When erreur-nullité is made, the nullity is relative to the consequences we have seen
above. 476 On the other hand, where there is “erreur -obstacle,” the nullity is absolute and
therefore the contract cannot be made valid. 477 In addition, as has been developed earlier,

478

mistake as to the person is usually not relevant. In such a case, the contract remains valid and
nullity cannot be raised by anybody. 479
Thus, the user of an electronic agent may stand better chances under French law since
there is no similar mechanism regarding the allocation of the risk of mistake. The only
requirement is that the mistake must be excusable. For instance, if it was easy for the
mistaken party to find out the truth, mistake is inexcusable and no relief will be granted. 480
Nonetheless, as long as the mistake must have occurred at the time of contracting, the same
kind of problems arise under French and American laws. When the contract is formed by
electronic agents, discovering the assumptions of the parties at that time may be problematic.

2.

Fraud

With respect to the use of electronic agents, fraud seems a less possible scenario than
mistake, mainly because of the required intent to deceive. Nonetheless, some issues arise.
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a.

The Concept of Fraud in the United States

Relief is available to a party who has given his assent to a contract, based on a
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. 481 In order to prove fraud, several elements must be
present beside the existence of a misrepresentation. First, the misrepresentation must have
been either fraudulent or material. 482 Second, the misrepresentation must have induced the
party victim of the fraud to contract. 483 Third, this party must have been justified in relying on
the misrepresentation. 484 Thus, it is not enough that the assertion is false; the misleading party
must have the intent to deceive. 485
With respect to the use of electro nic agents, if the person in charge of programming
uses deceitful tactics knowing that the responding party will give his assent based on these
tactics, there seems to be a classical case of fraud. 486 Indeed, all the elements necessary to
constitute fraud wo uld be present. There is a misrepresentation with the purpose of inducing
the other party to give his assent. The programming party acts with knowledge and the
responding party is justified in relying on the misrepresentation. If the responding party is an
electronic agent, the same conclusion can be reached. The responding electronic agent is
programmed to respond to a certain type of messages and therefore it would act within its
range of actions by sending a manifestation of assent.487
The remaining question is whether fraud can be proved if the misrepresentation has
been made by the electronic agent itself, the programming party having not engaged in the
fraud himself. In such a scenario, the parties would realize there has been a transmission error
481
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that has resulted in a misrepresentation. The intent or knowledge cannot be attributed to the
computer. Thus, the main problem would be for the claiming party to prove that the sending
party had the intent to mislead him in order to contract, which would be difficult if the
mistake generated from the computer without the programmer’s knowledge 488
Moreover, we have said that the reliance on the misrepresentation must be
justifiable.489 Hence, the question is whether it is reasonable to rely on unread transmissions
from an electronic agent. This question is actually similar to the one raised under the doctrine
of mistake. Should the parties who choose to contract through electronic agents bear the risk
of malfunction of their electronic agents? The standard of the reasonable person may be used
here. 490 Would a reasonable person be aware of the possibility of errors? If so, reliance on the
representation made by an electronic agent without human review would not be justifiable. 491
Nonetheless, since contracts can be made by electronic agents without any human review, 492
the possibility of avoiding such a contract so easily does not seem appropriate. People are
likely not to use electronic agents if they cannot rely on the resulting contracts. Furthermore,
the sophistication of the parties may vary significantly and should be taken into account in
evaluating whether reliance was reasonable. Two professionals who use electronic agents are
more likely to know the risks of their devices’ use. On the other hand, when an individual is
purchasing something on the Internet using an electronic agent, he may not have extensive (or
even reasonable) knowledge of the electronic agent’s features and mechanism. Thus, the
reasonable person standard does not appear to be adequate.
Therefore, as long as the misrepresentation has been the result of the sending party, the
traditional doctrine of fraud may apply. However, if the sending party did not engage any
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improper conduct, fraud does not seem to provide any relief for agreements formed by
electronic agents.

b.

The Doctrine of Dol in France

The Civil Code provides that “[d]ol is a cause of nullity of the agreement when the
artifices practiced by one party are such that is evident that without those artifices the other
party would not have contracted.”493 Three conditions are necessary in order for dol to be
proven. First, there must have been artifices, that is, some kind of misrepresentation. One of
the parties must have either lied or omitted to say something, 494 and the misrepresentation
must have been made with the intent to deceive.495 Second, dol must have been led to the
conclusion of the contract. In other words, without the misrepresentation, the misleading party
would not have given his assent.496 Finally, dol must have come from one of the parties. 497 If
a third-party is responsible for the misrepresentation, the party- victim may not avoid the
contract based on dol. However, if the third party is the agent of one of the parties, the rule
does not apply to him. 498
Thus, whether examining French or U.S. laws, one can make similar remarks. If one
seeks to obtain relief under dol, he will have to show the intent to deceive. In a scenario where
one party programs the agent to send misleading representations, it seems to be a classical
case of dol. However, if the electronic agent is responsible for the transmission error, the
party alleging dol would have to prove the intent and would face the same obstacles as one
claiming fraud under American law. Moreover, the fact that French law requires the dol to be
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the act of one of the parties may be a problem if electronic agents are not given the status of
agents. 499 Therefore, the French theory of dol does not appear to provide relief for contracts
concluded through electronic agents.

C.

Consumers: Should They Get Better Protection?

We have talked earlier about the sophistication (or lack of sophistication) of the parties
to a contract concluded by electronic agents. With the development of the Internet, people are
often led to use tools which they do not understand fully. It is hard to believe that one may be
bound by terms he had no opportunity to read. On the other hand, since an electronic agent
cannot act without instructions from its user, one could argue that the user actually defines for
himself the terms of the contract he wishes to enter into. This scenario may be true in the near
future. However, as has been stated above, with existing technology, electronic agents are
mainly programmed to make choices based on price and quality. What is the solution if, for
example, an agent concludes a contract which excludes all warranties? The approach may be
different under French or U.S. laws. European law, and particularly French law, is very
protective of consumers’ interests. 500 For instance, in France, if a contract si concluded
between a professional and an individual, the professional will have to respect several rules.
For example, a professional who wants to put a limitation of liability in the contract will have
to inform the consumer. 501 In addition, the Civil Code provides that “[t]he seller is required to
explain clearly that to which he obligates himself. Any obscure or ambiguous clause is
interpreted against the seller.” 502 Thus, courts are likely to hold in favor of the consumer, if it
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appears than the latter did not have the opportunity to read and understand his obligations and
rights.
However, things may be different under U.S. law. The UCITA states that a person
“has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the record or term is made available in a
manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review.”503 On
the other hand, an electronic agent “has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the
record or term is made available in manner that would enable a reasonably configured
electronic agent to react to the record or term.” 504 The redaction of the UCITA seems to mean
that if the electronic agent has the opportunity to review the terms of the contract, the party
cannot claim he did have the chance to read them. After all, the electronic agent has power to
conclude a contract on behalf of the user. In addition, the Act refers to “a reasonably
configured electronic agent.” Even for experts, 505 “[i]t is unclear […] what is meant by a
manner in which the agent could not react. The abilities of a typical software agent to
understand and react will be limited more by the effort expanded by its creator than the state
of the art.”506 Although the U.C.I.T.A. has not been enacted in many states, Article 2 of the
UCC allows warranties to be disclaimed, even against consumers, so long as the disclaimer is
clear and conspicuous. 507 (The U.C.I.T.A. also provides that a disclaimer good under Article 2
or Article 2A is effective for the U.C.I.T.A.). 508 However, if the disclaimer is blocked by
some consumer law (e.g., a state or federal consumer protection law), nothing in the UCITA
(or Article 2 or 2A) should interfere with such a block. 509

503

U.C.I.T.A, supra note 65, at §112(1) & (2).
Id., at, §112(2).
505
See Lerouge, supra note 41, at 424; see also James Raymond Davis, On Self-Enforcing Contracts, The Right
To Hack, and Willfully Ignorant Agents, 13 BERKELEY T ECH. L. J. 1145 (1998).
506
Id., at 1148.
507
UCITA, supra note 65, at §406(b) & (c); see also UCC §2-316(2) & (3).
508
UCITA, supra note 65, at §406(b)(4).
509
UCITA, supra note 65, at §104; see also UCC 2-102 & 2A-104.
504

67

The adequate solutions are perhaps better found in technology than law. 510 For
instance, if the agent does not find an offer meeting the requirements of its user, it could just
provide the user with a list of offers similar to the first one and wait for further instructions. 511
In addition, electronic agents could be developed that are programmed to meet a certain
degree of sophistication and to accept contracts only with terms and conditions specified by
the user. Consumer agents could, for example, be programmed only to accept contracts that
have certain warranty characteristics. They could also be programmed to keep a record of the
instructions in order to be used as evidence in the event of litigation. 512

D.

Third Parties’ Responsibility and Viruses

One important debate among the drafters of the UCITA was responsibility in the event
of a virus. 513 A virus may be defined as “any instruction to a computer that materially
disrupts, damages, or destroys information, or inappropriately interferes with the use of a
computer or communications facility, without the consent or permission of the owner and in a
manner not otherwise authorized.”514 Criminal law makes a party responsible for willfully
introducing a virus to someone else’s computer. 515 This remedy may be appropriate if the
person responsible for the virus is one of the parties or at least someone whose identity is
known or may be found by the parties to a contract. However, it is not always easy to find the
identity of a misfeasor in cyberspace. In the context of contracting, would a party be able to
avoid a contract because of an unknown misfeasor? What if one of the parties did not have an
anti-virus program on his computer? Should it be seen as an assumption of risk? There is no
510
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case law yet on how to allocate the risk of viruses.516 In such a scenario, it would seem fair to
be sure that the innocent and cautious party does not have to pay the consequences of the
somehow negligent behavior of the other party. On the other hand, even with anti- virus
programs, it is difficult to say that cyberspace is always a safe place and that people who are
willing to contract online are aware of the risks. Once again, the question is mainly one of
circumstances and it is difficult to foresee what the courts could decide in this type of cases.

516

Id.
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CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this analysis was to study the formatio n of contracts concluded by
electronic agents both in Europe and the United States. It has been shown that traditional rules
may be inadequate for this new category of contracts. Some progress has been made recently,
especially in the United States with the adoption of different important texts. However, the
new Acts do not provide enough substantive law and often leave us with questions as to the
remedies available to the parties. Thus, to ensure that the use of electronic agents is attractive
for users, a set of specific laws should be enacted. We have discussed the possible legal status
to give to electronic agents and the difficulties that arise from applying an existing theory to a
new tool. In choosing the best solution, drafters and legislatures in general will have to keep
in mind the realities of business. Electronic agents are used because they are convenient and
allow their users to save money and time. By placing an unjustified burden on one party, laws
may discourage people from contracting through electronic agents. On the other hand, if no
safe environment can be created, users may not rely on electronic agents. The question is one
of balance. Perhaps this is the reason why legislatures struggle to find adequate solutions. Or
as some argue, cyberspace law should not be viewed as a distinct body of legal doctrine and
there is nothing that existing principles cannot solve. In light of our analysis, this approach
appears doubtful. If a new set of rules is not created, at least a revision of the exis ting ones
seems necessary. This is an opinion that the legislatures apparently share since several
changes have been made both in the United States and in Europe recently (notably with the
revision of Article 2 of the UCC and the European Directive on Electronic Commerce).
Technology is in constant evolution and the possibilities offered by electronic agents
today are far from the ones that could be developed tomorrow. Thus, law faces a permanent
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challenge to adapt itself to these changes. Alternatively the solution may not be in the law but
in the technology itself. If electronic agents offered a wider range of services, such as choices
based on different criteria and the possibility to define in advance the terms and provisions of
the contract, a lot of issues that are faced today may not be relevant anymore.
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